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COMMENTS

THE WISCONSIN PUBLIC RECORDS LAW
I.

INTRODUCTION

With the extensive amendment of its longstanding public
records law,' Wisconsin has joined a growing number of
states which have recently enacted or revised state public
records laws.2 The interest of many state legislatures in
opening records to the public appears to stem from two
sources. One is the 1967 passage of the federal Freedom of
Information Act 3 (FOIA) which was followed by extensive
amendments in 1974.4 The second is a "post-Watergate"
concern for the accountability of government officials.A major premise underlying public records laws is the
rationale that in a self-governing society the electorate must
be able to examine the conduct of the affairs of government
as contained in documents and records kept by government
officials.6 The anticipated benefits to be derived from open
records include encouraging informed citizen participation
in government, giving citizens a better basis upon which to
evaluate the acts of officials, preventing government wrongdoing through increased public scrutiny and increasing public confidence in the political system. While there is a
1. Act of May 6, 1982, ch. 335, 1981 Wis. Laws 1385.
2. See Project, Government Information and the Rights of Citizens, 73 MIcH. L.
REV. 971, 1163 (1975).
3. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). See generally Project, supra note 2, at
1164.

4. 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1976 & Supp. III 1979), amended by Pub. L. 93-502.
5. CIVIL LIBERTIES 129 (S. Wasby ed. 1976). See also Comment, Administrative
Law-PublicAccess to Government-HeldRecords. A Neglected Right in North Carolina, 55 N.C.L. REV. 1187, 1187-88 (1977).
6. This premise is stated in the declaration of policy of some state public record
statutes. See ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2802 (1979 & Supp. 1981); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.

29, § 10001 (1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-1 (West 1982); N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW
§ 84 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30 (Law. Co-op. 1982);
TEx. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a(1) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); VT STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 315 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 2.1-340.1 (1979); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-1
(1980); Wis. STAT. § 19.31 (1981-82).
7. Project, supra note 2, at 1164.
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consensus as to the importance of these goals, the difficulty
which arises is that the right of access to public records cannot be absolute because access often interferes with two
other important concerns: a governmental need to maintain
confidentiality in certain matters in order to operate efficiently," and the need to preserve an individual right of privacy.9 The balancing of these confficting interests is the
dilemma posed in the development of any public record legislation. The variance in both the substantive law and the
procedural aspects of state and federal public records laws
represent different attempts to resolve this conffict.
This comment will examine the Wisconsin public records
law enacted as chapter 335 of the Laws of 1981,10 which became effective January 1, 1983, by comparing it with earlier
Wisconsin law, the public record laws of other states and
FOIA. Part II of this article will describe the common-law
background of public records laws and define the basic components found in various public records laws. Part III will
describe the history and case law background of the public
records law in Wisconsin. Finally, part IV will analyze the
provisions of the amended legislation.

II.

THE BACKGROUND OF PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS

A.

Common-Law History

In England and the United States there exists a commonlaw right to inspect and copy public records." I The com8. See generally Comment, Public Access to Governmental Records and Meetings
in Arizona, 16 ARIZ. L. REV. 891, 893-95 (1974) (discussion of reasons favoring and
disfavoring governmental secrecy).
9. See generally Project, supra note 2, at 1242-69 (state statutory protection of
privacy right); Vache & Makibe, Privacy in Government Records: PhilosophicalPerspectives and ProposalsforLegislation, 14 GONZ. L. REv. 515, 515-18 (1979) (discussion of issues regarding governmental record keeping and sensitive data).
10. This legislation extensively amended Wis. STAT. § 19.21 (1979-80), the previous Wisconsin public record law.
11. H. CRoss, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNow 25-26 (1953). A few commentators feel there is a constitutional right of access to public records. See, e.g., Hennings,
ConstitutionalLaw: The People'sRight to Know, 45 A.B.A. J. 668-70 (1959); Comment, The FirstAmendment andthe Public Right to Information, 35 U. PITT. L. REv.
93, 93-94 (1973). Most commentators, however, feel there are no constitutional underpinnings. See also, e.g., Comment, The Right to Know and the Duty to WithholdThe Caseof the PentagonPapers, 120 U. PA. L. REv. 271, 273 (1971); Note, The Rights
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mon-law rules governing inspection developed in response
to the use of records as evidence in litigation and, despite the
12
right of inspection, contained many restrictions on access.
Records were defined narrowly to include only those documents required to be kept by law.' 3 The enforcement of the
right of inspection was generally limited to include only persons whose interest in a record gave them standing to maintain or defend a lawsuit.' 4 At common law a writ of
mandamus was the only means available for enforcing the
right of inspection. 15
Gradually, state statutes were enacted to define access to
public records. Those statutes often enlarged the commonlaw right of inspection.16 The expansion of the right to inspect public records reflected a concern that citizens should
have access to public records in order to monitor the acts of
public officials.' 7 While early state statutes were brief one or
two sentence statements,' 8 some modem state statutes are extremely detailed and contain extensive definitional sections
as well as lists of specific records which are either open or
closed to public inspection. 19 In recent years the trend in
drafting statutes has been toward liberalization of access and
the addition of enforcement mechanisms.20 Some of the
more recent statutes were drafted in conjunction with open
of the Public and the Press to Gather Information, 87 HARv. L. REv. 1505, 1512-13

(1974).
12. H. CROSS, supra note 11, at 25-26.
13. See, e.g., Amos v. Gunn, 84 Fla. 285, 94 So. 615 (1922); Steiner v. McMillan,

59 Mont. 30, 195 P. 836 (1921).
14. See, e.g., Brewer v. Watson, 71 Ala. 299 (1882); State ex rel. Ferry v. Williams, 41 N.J.L. 332 (1879); In re Caswell, 18 R.I. 835, 29 A. 259 (1893).

15. See, e.g., State ex rel. Colescott v. King, 154 Ind. 621, 57 N.E. 535 (1900);
Egan v. Board of Water Supply, 205 N.Y. 147, 98 N.E. 467 (1912); Clement v. Graham, 78 Vt. 290, 63 A. 146 (1906); Annot., 60 A.L.R. 1356 (1929).

16. See H. CRoss, supra note 11, at 49.
17. Woodson & Tannen, Federal ConstitutionalPrivacy and the Florida Public

Records Law. Resolving the Conflict, 33 U. FLA. L. REv. 313, 326 (1981).
18. Comment, Public Inspection of State and Municipal Executive Documents:
"Everybody, PracticalyEverything, Anytime, Except.... ", 45 FORDHAM L. REV.

1105, 1107 (1977).
19. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 76A, § 2 (Supp. 1982); Tux. REv. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a)(3), (6),
(10) (Vernon Supp. 1982-1983); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317 (Supp. 1982).
20. See Comment, supra note 18, at 1136-37.
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meetings laws21 or information privacy acts. 22 Forty-nine
states and the District of Columbia now have statutes dealing with state public records23 and FOIA24 defines access to
the records of federal agencies.
B. Basic Components of Public Records Laws
Although the public records laws of a few states which
modeled their statutes after the FOIA contain some similarities,25 public records laws vary greatly from state to state in
21. Id. at 1106.
22. See Comment, The Use andAbuse of ComputerizedInformation: Striking a
Balance Between PersonalPrivacyInterests and OrganizationalInformation Needs, 44
ALB. L. REV. 589, 602-03 (1980).
23. See ALA. CODE § 36-12-40 (1975); ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.110 (1973); ARIz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 39-121 (1974); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1979 & Supp. 1981);
CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6253 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-203
(1982); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. §§ 1-19 (West 1969 & Supp. 1982-1983); DEL. CODE
ANN. tit. 29, § 10003 (1979); D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 1-1522 (West Supp. 1978-1979);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.01 (West 1982); GA. CODE ANN. § 50-18-70 (1982); HAWAII
REV. STAT. § 92-51 (1976); IDAHO CODE § 9-301 (1979); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116,
§ 43.6 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-3 (West 1982); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 68A.2 (West 1973); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-201 (1981); Ky. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 61.872 (Baldwin 1983); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 44.31 (West 1982); ME. REV.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 408 (1979); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 2 (Supp. 1982); MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 66, § 10 (West Supp. 1983-1984); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 15.233 (1981); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 13.03 (West Supp. 1983); Mo. ANN. STAT.
§ 109.180 (Vernon 1966); MONT. CODE ANN. § 2-6-102 (1981); NEB. REV. STAT. § 84712 (1981); NEV. REV. STAT. § 239.010 (1979); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:4
(1977); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 47:1A-2 (west Supp. 1983-1984); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 14-21 (1978); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87 (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 132-6 (1981); N.D. CENT. CODE § 44-04-18 (1978); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 149.43
(Page Supp. 1982); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 51, § 24 (west 1962); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 192.420 (1981); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 65, § 66.2 (Purdon 1959); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 382-3 (Supp. 1982); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-30 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS ANN. § 1-27-1 (1980 & Supp. 1982); TENN. CODE ANN. § 10-7-503 (Supp.
1982); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17(a)(4) (Vernon Supp. 1982); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 78-26-2 (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 316 (Supp. 1982); VA. CODE
§ 2.1-342 (Supp. 1983); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 42.17.260 (Supp. 1982); W. VA.
CODE § 29B-1-3 (1980); WIS. STAT. § 19.31 (1981-82); Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-202 (1977 &
Supp. 1982). Mississippi does not have a public records law.
24. See generally COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, THIRTEENTH REPORT, A CITIZEN'S GUIDE ON HOW TO USE THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT

AND THE PRIVACY ACT IN REQUESTING GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS (1977) (available
at Marquette University School of Journalism) (details the use of FOIA); THE 1981
EDITION OF LITIGATION UNDER THE FEDERAL FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT AND

PRIVACY ACT (C. Marwick ed. 1980) [hereinafter cited as LITIGATION UNDER FOIA]
(describing cases involving FOIA and procedures for obtaining federal records).
25. Vache & Makibe, supra note 9, at 515. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
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both their scope and their effect.26 Public records statutes
can be compared through an examination of four components present in all statutes.2 7 These components include the
definition of who may inspect a public record, the description of what material constitutes a public record, the number
and nature of the exemptions to public records, and the
method of enforcement the statute provides. 28 The scope of
these elements determines the degree to which records will
be open to the public.
1. Who May Inspect?
The majority of state statutes provide that "any person"
may examine a public record.29 Most judicial interpretations
of the phrase "any person" indicate that the motive of the
requester is irrelevant to the question of whether to grant
access.3 0 Only a few specific limitations remain in state statutes which restrict access to a public record on the basis of
the status of the party making the request. A few states restrict inspection to state citizens 3' or disallow inspection arising from a purely commercial purpose.32 Most states allow a
person to inspect a public record on behalf of someone else
and indicate that corporations, labor unions, and members
of the media all share the same rights of inspection which
the general public possesses.33
Some states have found it necessary to impose limitations
associated with practical necessities on the right to inspect
public records.34 Some statutes limit the hours during which
a request may be made 3- and require the cost of the search
26. Braverman & Heppler, A PracticalReview of State Open Records Laws, 49
GEO. WASH. L. REv. 720, 722 (1981).
27. H. CRoss, supra note 11, at 19; Comment, supra note 18, at 1111.
28. H. CROSS, supra note 11, at 19; Comment, supra note 18, at 1111.
29. See, e.g., ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. 39-121.01(D)(1) (Supp. 1975-1983); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 12-2804 (1979); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 61.872(1) (Baldwin 1983).

30. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 728.
31. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10003 (1979);
(1979); IND. CODE ANN. § 5-14-1-3 (West 1982).

32. Comment, supra note 18, at 1130-31.
33. Id. at 1134.
34. Comment, supra note 5, at 1201.
35. See, e.g., IOWA CODE ANN. § 68A.4 (West 1973).

IDAHO CODE

§ 9-301
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or the copying to be borne by the requester. 6 Other statutes
have provisions which address the safety of the records.37
The right to inspect records has uniformly been held to include the right to make copies even in the absence of specific
language.3 8
2. What is a Public Record?
The question of what records are covered by public
records laws is determined by three factors. 39 The first factor
concerns the identification of those governmental entities
which are subject to the public records law.4° Some public
records laws deal only with agencies and officers of the executive branch,4 1 while other statutes include all three
branches 42 and may also extend to partially publicly funded
nonprofit organizations.4 3 The second factor involves the
form which a record may take. 44 Early statutes envisioned
records only in the form of books or papers. Many states
have now expanded their definition of the physical form
which a record may take to also include photographs, tape

recordings and computer printouts; 46 a few state statutes in-

dicate that a record may take any physical form whatsoever. 47 The third factor which affects the status of records is
their nature and origin.48 Some states still retain the narrow
36. See, e.g., KY. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.874 (Baldwin 1983); TEx. REv. Civ.
ANN. art. 6252-17a(9) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
37. Comment, supra note 5, at 1201-02.
38. See, e.g., Whorton v. Gaspard, 239 Ark. 715, 393 S.W.2d 773 (1965); Fuller v.
State ex rel. O'Donnell, 154 Fla. 368, 17 So. 2d 607 (1944); Marsh v. Sanders, 110 La.
726, 34 So. 752 (1903).
39. Comment, supra note 18, at 1112-13.
40. Id. at 1113.
41. See, e.g., ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 116, § 3 (Smith-Hurd 1977). The Texas public
records statute applies to the legislative and executive branches, but not to the judicial
branch. TEx. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 6252-17a(2) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
42. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2803 (1979 & Supp. 1981); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 61.870(1) (Baldwin 1983).
43. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.870(1) (Baldwin 1983). The Kentucky
public records statute applies to any group which derives at least 25% of its funding
from a state or local authority.
44. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 732.
45. Id.
46. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § l(b) (1980).
47. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-202(7) (1982).
48. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 733.
STAT.
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common-law definition that public records are limited to
those which are "required by law to be made." 49 The
broadest statutory definitions include all documentary material which a public body may possess.5 0 Between these extremes can be found a myriad of definitions which determine
the scope of a public record. Such definitions significantly
affect the accessibility of certain categories of materials, such
as correspondence to and from an agency or official, notes,
rough drafts, or other preliminary materials, and intraoffice
or interoffice memoranda.5
3. Exempted Materials.
Materials falling within the definition of a public record
are accessible to the public unless they are exempted from
public inspection. z If some type of exemption applies, the
disclosure provisions of the public records statute become inoperative. 3 Some exemptions typically found in public
records statutes include the following: information required
to be kept confidential by state and federal laws; 54 law enforcement and investigation information; 5 juvenile, adop57
tion, and medical records; 5 6 personnel and school files;
trade secrets; 58 preliminary memoranda; 9 invasion of privacy provisions; 60 and information which would jeopardize
competitive bidding or a suit pending against a goveramen49. See, e.g.,

KAN. STAT. ANN. 45-201(a) (1981).
50. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-18(d) (West 1969 & Supp. 1982-1983).
51. Comment, supra note 18, at 1118-19.
52. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 737-38.
53. Id.
54. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 809.25.120 (1973); N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(a)
(McKinney Supp. 1982-1983).
55. See, e.g., COLO. REv. STAT. § 24-72-202(6) (1982); DEL. CODE. ANN. tit. 29,
§ 10002(d)(3) (1979).
56. See, e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 09.25.120 (1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 3
(Supp. 1982).
57. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 29, § 10002(d)(1) (1979); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT.
ANN. art. 6252-17a(3)(a)(14) (Vernon Supp. 1982).
58. See, e.g., N.Y. PUB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(d) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); VT.
STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 317(b)(9) (Supp. 1982).
59. See, e.g., CAL. GOVT CODE § 6254 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1)(g) (Baldwin 1983).
60. See, e.g., CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 1980 & Supp. 1983); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 61.878(1)(a) (Baldwin 1983); S.C. CODE ANN. § 30-4-40(a)(2) (Law.
Co-op. Supp. 1982).
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tal unit.61
In addition to or in lieu of specifically stated exemptions,
some state statutes or judicial decisions provide for the use
of a balancing test to determine whether a specific record
will be disclosed.62 These balancing tests usually weigh the
public interest to be served by disclosure against the private
or public interest jeopardized by the disclosure of the record
being sought.63 If the interest threatened by disclosure outweighs the public right to know, access will be denied.
4.

Enforcement.
The enforcement mechanism contained in open records
statutes is a major determinant of their effectiveness. 64 A delay in resolution may often, as a practical matter, amount to
a denial of relief. Some states provide only the common-law
remedy of mandamus.6 5 Other statutes establish an appeals
board or utilize an opinion by a state officer to economically
expedite the appeal of a decision denying access. 66 The penalties imposed for violations of public records laws vary
from state to state. Although a few statutes prescribe no
68
penalty for violation, 67 others call for removal from office
or carry criminal sanctions, 69 civil forfeitures" or punitive
damages. 7 '
61. See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. OFF. LAW § 87(2)(c) (McKinney Supp. 1982-1983); S.C.
CODE ANN. § 30-4-30(a)(5) (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1982).
62. Comment, supra note 18, at 1125.

63.
64.
65.
66.

Id.
See Project,supra note 2, at 1186-87.
Comment, supra note 18, at 1135.
See id.

67. See, e.g., HAWAII REV. STAT. § 92-52 (1976).
68. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 119.02 (West 1982); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45.203
(1981); NEB. REv. STAT. § 84-712.09 (1981).
69. See, e.g., ARK. STAT. ANN. § 12-2807 (1979); Wyo. STAT. § 16-4-205 (1982).
70. See, e.g., OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 149.99 (Page Supp. 1982) (maximum $500
per offense); VA. CODE § 2.1-346.1 (1979) ($25 to $500 fine); Wis. STAT. § 19.37 (198 1-

82) (maximum $1,000 fine).
71. See, e.g., MD. ANN. CODE art. 76A, § 5(d) (1980 & Supp. 1982) (punitive
damages); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 91-A:8 (1977 & Supp. 1979) (attorney's fees).
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III.

THE HISTORY OF PUBLIC RECORDS LAWS IN
WISCONSIN

A. Eary History
Concern about the safekeeping of records and public access to certain records is evident in Wisconsin history. In
1856 the Wisconsin Supreme Court declared that wood for
heating and candles for lighting must be provided so that
citizens could comfortably transact business and examine all
books and papers required to be kept in the clerk of court's
office.72 Early Wisconsin statutes contained various sections
requiring outgoing officers to hand their records over to suc73
cessors and provided for public inspection of the records.
The Wisconsin Supreme Court, in an early decision,74 refused to adopt common-law restrictions regarding who
should be allowed to examine public records. The case involved an individual who wanted to copy public records in
order to set up a rival abstract business. 75 The local register
of deeds objected, contending that the right to inspect and
copy was confined to one having an interest beyond mere
curiosity or pecuniary gain. 76 The court departed from prior
common law and ruled that any person may examine and
copy public records for any lawful purpose.7 7 The court
noted that the right of inspection was subject to the payment
of fees and reasonable supervision.
In 1917, the first unified public records law was enacted
in Wisconsin. 79 The statute provided that every officer of a
72. County of Jefferson v. Besley, 5 Wis. 134 (1856). The court in Besley noted,
however, that the clerk was not required to keep a tavern for the public's convenience.
Id. at 136.
73. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ch. 37, § 700 (1878). See also International Union v.
Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 366-68, 29 N.W.2d 730, 733 (1947) (listing the numerous
records statutes existing prior to the 1917 passage of a uniform records law).
74. Hanson v. Eichstaedt, 69 Wis. 538, 35 N.W. 30 (1887).
75. Id. at 539, 35 N.W. at 30. See also Rock County v. Weirick, 143 Wis. 500,
128 N.W. 94 (1910), which deals with a similar situation and reached the same
conclusion.
76. Hanson v. Eichstaedt, 69 Wis. 538, 541, 35 N.W. 30, 31 (1887).
77. Id. at 547, 35 N.W. at 34.
78. Id. See also Musback v. Schaefer, 115 Wis. 357, 91 N.W. 966 (1902) (court
held that minutes of a school board meeting were public records and the clerk could
charge no more than the statutory fee for certified copies of the records).
79. See Wis. STAT. § 18.01 (1917). This statute was later renumbered as Wis.
STAT. § 19.21 (1979).
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state, county, municipal entity or school district was the legal
custodian of the records of the body and responsible for
their care and control.80 It defined public records as including three categories of materials: materials required to be
kept in the officer's office, materials in the lawful possession
or control of the officer or his deputies, and materials the
officer is lawfully entitled to possess or control. 81 The statute
defined the physical form a record may take with the words
"property or things. 82 The law afforded "any person" access to public records 83 and established84 a $25 to $2,000 forfeiture for the violation of the statute.
B.

Wisconsin JudicialDecisions

Until the passage of chapter 335 in 1981, Wisconsin's
public records law of 1917 remained virtually unchanged.85
During this interim period, the Wisconsin Supreme Court
issued ten decisions interpreting the state's public records
law. Because the public records statute was very brief,86
80. Wis. STAT. § 18.01 (1917).

81. Id.
82. Id. § 18.01(2).
83. Id. The only limitations expressed in the statute were that the inspection
must take place during office hours and be subject to any regulations the custodian
might prescribe.
84. Id. § 18.01(4).
85. See Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.21 historical note (West 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984)
(listing of the changes that were made in the public records law between 1917 and
1979).
86. Wis. STAT. § 19.21 (1979-80) reads in part:
(1) Each and every officer of the state, or of any county, town, city, village, school district, or other municipality or district, is the legal custodian of
and shall safely keep and preserve all property and things received from his
predecessor or other persons and required by law to be filed, deposited, or kept
in his office, or which are in the lawful possession or control of himself or his
deputies, or to the possession or control of which he or they may be lawfully
entitled, as such officers.
(2) Except as expressly provided otherwise, any person may with proper
care, during office hours and subject to such orders or regulations as the custodian thereof prescribes, examine or copy any of the property or things mentioned in sub. (1). Any person may, at his or her own expense and under such
reasonable regulations as the custodian prescribes, copy or duplicate any
materials, including but not limited to blueprints, slides, photographs and
drawings. Duplication of university expansion materials may be performed
away from the office of the custodian if necessary. Computer programs, as
defined in § 16.97(4)(c), are not subject to examination under this subsection,
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those decisions have served as a primary body of law in determining the rights of access to records. With the adoption
of chapter 335, those cases will continue to be an important
element in the interpretation of the new public records statute.87 An examination of those decisions follows and focuses
on the four basic components of public records laws described in part II above.
1. Who May Inspect?
In regard to the question of who may examine a public
record, the Wisconsin Supreme Court has declined to apply

any of the limitations imposed at common law by stating
that the statutory right of inspection is "independent and in
derogation of the common law."88 Partnerships, associations, political and corporate bodies have been found to be
within the statutory words affording "any person" the right
to inspection.8 9 The court also has ruled that no requirement
of citizenship may be imposed upon a person seeking inspec-

tion of records. 90

but the data stored in the memory of a computer is subject to the right of
examination and copying.
(3) Upon the expiration of his term of office, or whenever his office becomes vacant, each such officer, or on his death his legal representative, shall
on demand deliver to his successor all such property and things then in his
custody, and his successor shall receipt therefor to said officer, who shall file
said receipt, as the case may be, in the office of the secretary of state, county
clerk, town clerk, city clerk, village clerk, school district clerk, or clerk or other
secretarial officer of the municipality or district, respectively; but if a vacancy
occurs before such successor is qualified, such property and things shall be
delivered to and be receipted for by such secretary or clerk, respectively, on
behalf of the successor, to be delivered to such successor upon the latter's receipt.
(4) Any person who violates this section shall, in addition to any other
liability or penalty, civil or criminal, forfeit not less than $25 nor more than
$2,000; such forfeiture to be enforced by a civil action on behalf of, and the
proceeds to be paid into the treasury of the state, municipality, or district, as
the case may be.
87. The relationship between case law and chapter 335 is confirmed in a provision of the new statute which provides "[s]ubstantive common law principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive copies of records shall remain in effect." Wis.
STAT. § 19.35(l) (1981-82).
88. State ex rel. Journal Co. v. County Court, 43 Wis. 2d 297, 306, 168 N.W.2d
836, 840 (1969).
89. Id. at 309, 168 N.W.2d at 841.
90. Id.
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Several Wisconsin cases have indicated that a newspaper
has the same right as any individual to examine public
records 9 ' and even if the motivation of the newspaper is to
publish the information, inspection will be allowed. In State
ex rel. Youmans v. Owens,92 the supreme court ruled that the
publisher of the Waukesha Freeman newspaper could bring
an action against the mayor of the city of Waukesha to gain
access to a report inhis custody on police misconduct.93 The
court pointed out the fact that the newspaper publisher's
"motivation in seeking inspection is to benefit his newspaper
and permit it to publish the material gained therefrom is immaterial." 94 Similarly, in State ex rel. JournalCo. v. County
Court,95 the supreme court held that a judge could not deny
a newspaper access to a decision in a much publicized custody case despite the fears of the trial judge that publicity of
the case would be harmful to the child and to the enforcement of the decision of the court.96
The determination by the Wisconsin Supreme Court that
the motivation of a requester may not be a factor in the decision to grant access has been followed in attorney general
opinions regarding access to records sought solely for commercial purposes. 97 The attorney general has opined that inspection of birth records 98 and lists of licensees99 cannot be
withheld in order to protect individuals from unsolicited
mail.
91. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979); State ex
rel. Journal Co. v. County Court, 43 Wis. 2d 297, 168 N.W.2d 836 (1969); State ex rel.
Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
92. 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
93. Id. at 677, 137 N.W.2d at 472.
94. Id.
95. 43 Wis. 2d 297, 168 N.W.2d 836 (1969).
96. Id. at 311-12, 168 N.W.2d at 842-43.
97. See 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 231 (1979); 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 67 (1969).
98. 58 Op. Att'y Gen. 67 (1969). The opinion was issued in response to the concern of the Department of Health and Social Services that insurance salesmen and
salesmen for baby foods, clothing and magazines sought birth records for commercial
purposes.
99. 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 231 (1979). This opinion was requested by the Department
of Regulation and Licensing.
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2. What is a Public Record?
In its decisions regarding what material constitutes a
public record and thus is open to inspection, the Wisconsin
Supreme Court has defined "public record" very broadly. t 0
The court's opinions on what is a public record may be approached in the context of two basic questions. First, when
is a document not sufficiently related to the office or officer
to be considered part of the public record? Second, are preliminary, nonfinal documents or interdepartmental memoranda public records?
The question of when a document is "sufficiently related" to an officer that it becomes public record was addressed by the supreme court in two cases, State ex rel
02
Dinneen v. Larson'0 ' and InternationalUnion v. Gooding.
Both cases involved an officer of a state agency who received
unsolicited materials from citizens. In Dinneen, Public Securities Commission Secretary Dinneen received letters of
complaint regarding a securities dealer.' 0 3 Dinneen sent
these letters to the dealer complained of in the letters rather
than keeping them in the commission's possession.1 4 The
supreme court ruled that because the letters were "relevant
and material to matters which were within the commission's
supervision and powers to investigate,"'105 they were required
to be kept in the Commission's office under the public
records law.10 6 The Dinneen court did indicate that some letby an agency might be deemed
ters or materials received
"mere fugitive papers."'' 0 7 These papers, the court stated, are
"subject to disposition at the pleasure of the [official]."' 0 8
0 9 the Wisconsin
In International Union v. Gooding,1
Supreme Court declared that a petition received by the Wisconsin Employment Relations Board was a public record
100. H. CRoss, supra note 11, at 43-44.
101. 231 Wis. 207, 284 N.W. 21 (1939).
102. 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947).
103. 231 Wis. at 211, 284 N.W. at 24.
104. Id.
105. Id. at 213-14, 284 N.W. at 25.
106. Id. at 214, 284 N.W. at 25.
107. Id. (describing fugitive papers as personal papers which are not relevant to a
legitimate concern of the agency).
108. Id. at 214, 284 N.W. at 25.
109. 251 Wis. 362, 29 N.W.2d 730 (1947).
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and open to inspection despite the fact that the Board had no
authority to act upon it." 0 The court stated that an officer
has the power to dispose of a fugitive paper if he or she finds
the document to have "no relation to the function of the office."'' However, the court determined that the petition had
a relation to the office and was not a fugitive paper because
it was placed in the board's official file and a formal opinion
was written in response to it.12 Thus, Dinneen and Gooding
indicate that if a court makes an objective determination
that a paper has a relation to the duties of an office or if an
officer makes a subjective determination to keep or to act
upon a document, that material becomes a public record.
The second question the Wisconsin Supreme Court has
addressed in defining a public record is whether nonfinal
materials, preliminary documents or interdepartmental
memorandum are public records. This question was first
considered in State ex re. Spencer v. Freedy. 113 In Spencer,
the court ruled that reports prepared by deputies on behalf
of the state fire marshal (on the causes of fires) were not public records despite the fact that the reports had been filed in
the marshal's office. 114 The court indicated that because statistics on fires compiled by the office had an educational
value, the statistical information would be available to the
public." 5 However, the court refused to view the reports,
correspondence or communications regarding specific fires
dubious raas a public record and based its decision on the
16
tionale that they "carry no public interest."'
In a later case, State ex rel Youmans v. Owens, 1 7 the
court indicated that the Spencer decision had been overruled
sub silentio in Gooding." 8 In Youmans, the requested document was a report by a city attorney stemming from his investigation of alleged police misconduct. 119 The report was
110.
I11.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id. at 372, 29 N.W.2d at 735.
Id. at 370-71, 29 N.W.2d at 735.
Id. at 371, 29 N.W.2d at 735.
198 Wis. 388, 223 N.W. 861 (1929).
Id. at 392, 223 N.W. at 862.
Id. at 391, 223 N.W. at 862.
Id.
28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
Id. at 679, 137 N.W.2d at 473.
Id. at 675, 137 N.W.2d at 471.
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in the custody of the mayor who had received it in his capacity as the head of the police department. 20 The supreme
court ruled that the report was a public record despite the
fact that it was not a formal report of conclusions from the
investigation, but merely contained interdepartmental memoranda and the statements of persons interviewed.121 In
reaching this conclusion the court relied upon its earlier
statement in Gooding:
It is the rule independently of statute that public records
include not only papers specifically required to be kept by
a public officer but all written memorials made by a public
officer within his authority where such writings constitute a
method of dischargconvenient, appropriate, or 1customary
22
ing the duties of the office.
Youmans thus indicated that preliminary material, and intradepartmental and interdepartmental memoranda, are
public record.
3.

Exempted Materials.

Although the supreme court's definition of public record
is very inclusive, the court has stated that the right to inspect
a public record is not absolute. 23 Wisconsin appellate
courts have indicated two situations in which materials
which are public records may be exempt from disclosure.
First, it has been recognized that the right to inspect a public
record may be limited or denied by an express statutory provision to the contrary. 24 An example of this exemption
arose in Hathaway v. Joint School District2 5 which involved
the denial of access to a computer listing of the names and
addresses of pupils in a school district. 2 6 The district contended that the information was a confidential pupil record
and as such was exempt from disclosure under section
120. Id.
121. Id. at 679-80, 137 N.W.2d at 473.

122. Id. at 679, 137 N.W.2d at 473 (quoting Gooding, 251 Wis. at 370-71, 29
N.W.2d at 735).
123. Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 516, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1967); State ex
rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 137 N.W.2d 470, 474 (1965).
124. Although this has not been stated directly by the Wisconsin Supreme Court,
the Wisconsin Attorney General has so stated in 63 Op. Att'y Gen. 400, 406 (1974).
125. 110 Wis. 2d 254, 329 N.W.2d 217 (Ct. App. 1982).
126. Id. at 254-55, 329 N.W.2d at 217.
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118.125 (pupil records) of the Wisconsin statutes.'2 7 In its
decision the court of appeals stated that the list was a public
record and accessible under the public records statute unless
it was found to come within the statutory definition of pupil
record. 28 The Hathaway court found that although the information was derived from pupil records, it did not fall
within the definition of personal pupil information which the
statute sought to protect.1329
The list was deemed to be acces0
sible as a public record.
The second situation in which material considered to be
public record may be exempted from disclosure exists when
it is determined that the harm likely to result to the public
interest from permitting inspection outweighs any benefit to
the public which may be gained from inspection.13' The
supreme court has elaborated on the use of this judicially
created balancing test in several cases. The balancing must
be undertaken with the presumption that material which is a
public record is open to inspection. 32 When a request to
inspect a record is made, the custodian of the record has the
responsibility to weigh the competing interests in order to
determine whether the strong policy recognizing the public
interest in inspection is outweighed by the harm to the pub33
lic interest which may result from permitting inspection.
A custodian who decides not to allow inspection after applying the balancing test must state the reasons which justify the
refusal. 134 The stated reasons must be specific,35based upon
public policy and cannot be legal conclusions.
Although the Wisconsin Supreme Court has refused to
categorize the situations in which the use of the balancing
127. Id. at 255, 329 N.W.2d at 217.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
131. State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 681, 137 N.W.2d 470, 474
(1965).
132. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426, 279 N.W.2d 179, 183-84
(1979); State ex rel. Dalton v. Mundy, 80 Wis. 2d 190, 196, 257 N.W.2d 877, 880
(1977).
133. Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 518, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1967); State ex
rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 682, 137 N.W.2d 470, 475 (1965).
134. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 179, 184 (1979);
Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 518, 153 N.W.2d 501, 503 (1967).
135. Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 517, 153 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1967).
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test would result in a justified refusal to permit inspection,
the court's employment of the balancing test in two cases is
instructive in regard to factors which may be considered in
the use of the test. In State ex rel Youmans v. Owens, 136 the
court stated that the legislative policy expressed in the state
open meeting law 137 can be used as a reference in determining whether inspection of a public record should be
granted. 38 In Youmans the court applied the exception to
the open meeting law that allows a closed session to be held
if material discussed is "[f]inancial, medical, social or personal histories and disciplinary data which may unduly
damage reputations."' 139 The court reviewed the refusal of
the mayor to permit inspection of a report on alleged police
misconduct and remanded the case to the trial court with the
directive that it entertain the question of whether undue
damage to reputations would outweigh the interest of the
public in knowing whether the mayor was derelict in not initiating disciplinary proceedings against the officers. 40 The
supreme court also stated that if the statements in the report
were first-hand knowledge rather than hearsay, the damage
to the officers' reputations would
not outweigh the benefit to
14 1
access.
granting
in
public
the
The denial by the Milwaukee Chief of Police of a request
by the Milwaukee Journalnewspaper to inspect a daily arrest
list, known as the police "blotter," 142 was reviewed in Newspapers,Inc. v. Breier. 43 The reason enunciated for refusing
access to the "blotter" was that disclosure might harm the
arrested individuals. 144 The court balanced the harm to the
reputation of the individuals involved who might not ever be
136. 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
137. Formerly Wis. STAT. § 14.90 (1965), (current version at Wis. STAT. § 19.81
(1981-82)).
138. Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 685, 137 N.W.2d at 476.
139. Id. at 685-86, 137 N.W.2d at 476-77.
140. Id. at 685-85a, 137 N.W.2d at 476-77.
141. Id. at 685, 137 N.W.2d at 476.

142. The "blotter" lists the names of persons arrested and the alleged offense
committed at the time of the arrest. Frequently as a result of a charging conference, a
person is charged with a lesser offense or is not charged at all. Thus, disclosure of
"blotter" information might distort the gravity of an alleged offense.
143.

189 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).

144. Id. at 428, 279 N.W.2d at 181.
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formally charged against the interest of the public in curbing
the abuse of the arrest power and determined that the public
right to know outweighed the potential harm to individuals. 45 Thus, the records were ordered open to public
inspection. 146
These two cases demonstrated the problems inherent in
the use of a balancing test. In each case the supreme court
balanced factors which were not obvious to most persons. In
compelling a custodian, who must decide whether to permit
access to a public record, to apply a delicate and yet complicated balancing test, there is an expectation that the custodian possesses a level of legal sophistication. This may be
unrealistic. As both the Youmans and Breier cases indicate,
there are very difficult issues involved upon which legally
trained minds are likely to differ. Thus, the balancing test is
a less than adequate means to resolve the complex problem
of determining when the public interest warrants disclosure
of a record.
4.

Enforcement.

If a requester is denied inspection of a record, the only
remedy for a denial in Wisconsin prior to the enactment of
chapter 335 was to seek a writ of mandamus to compel production of the record. 147 The Wisconsin Supreme Court, 14in9
Beckon v. Emery14 8 and State ex rel Youmans v. Owens,
described the procedure to be followed in reviewing the denial of access to a record. Upon application for the writ, the
custodian who refused access to the record was obligated to
specifically state the reasons for the denial.150 If a custodian
failed to state a valid reason for refusing inspection, the writ
5
of mandamus was granted without a further hearing. 1
Upon receiving a statement of the reason for withholding the
document, the presiding judge was obligated to repeat the
process employed by the custodian by applying the same
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.

Id. at 437, 279 N.W.2d at 189.
Id. at 440, 279 N.W.2d at 190.
See Beckon v. Emery, 36 Wis. 2d 510, 519, 153 N.W.2d 501, 504 (1967).
36 Wis. 2d 510, 153 N.W.2d 501 (1967).
28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965).
Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 682, 137 N.W.2d at 475.
Beckon, 36 Wis. 2d at 517-18, 153 N.W.2d at 504.
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balancing test to determine if harm to the public interest resulting from the granting of access outweighed the presumed
benefit of access.1 52 In conducting this weighing process the
presiding judge was obligated to bear in mind the presumption that a public record should be available for inspection
53
and access should only be denied in the exceptional case.1
The presiding judge was empowered to examine the record
in camera im reaching a decision. 54 If the judge found only
a portion of a document to be adverse to the public interest,
he could order the portion obscured before granting
inspection. 55
C

The Legislative History of Chapter 335

Attempts to modify the longstanding Wisconsin public
records law began in 1977 and continued throughout the
1979 session of the legislature. 56 These bills proposed substantial procedural and substantive changes to the existing

statute. They were met with strong opposition and none
were enacted. In the 1981 legislative session, Senate Bill 250
was introduced. 57 In its original form Senate Bill 250 in-

cluded provisions for the application of two different balancing tests and listed seventeen specific types of materials to
which the balancing tests were to be applied. 58 The bill also
provided for an Ethics and Open Records Board with the
152. Youmans, 28 Wis. 2d at 682, 137 N.W.2d at 475.
153. Id. at 683, 137 N.W.2d at 475.
154. Id. at 682, 137 N.W.2d at 475.
155. Id. at 683, 137 N.W.2d at 475.
156. The public records legislation proposed included: Wis. A.B. 780 (1977);
Wis. A.B. 1109 (1979); Wis. S.B. 482 (1979).
157. Wis. S.B. 250 (1981) was a reproposal of Wis. S.B. 482 (1979).
158. One balancing test directed the custodian not to open the following materials to inspection if the harm to the public "outweighed" the benefit which might be
gained from disclosure: trade secrets, test questions and answers, unpublished university research data, key codes and lock combinations, computer security information,
information obtained under a pledge of confidentiality, information regarding medical diagnosis which is individually identifiable, and plans for secure structures.
The second balancing test directed the custodian not to open the following materials to the public if the harm to the public "substantially outweighed" the benefit
which might be gained from disclosure: information regarding litigation strategy, appraisals and materials involved in competitive bargaining, criminal investigation information, criminal history records, intraagency advisory memoranda,
correspondence of elected officials, personnel records, judicial records and minutes of
closed governmental meetings. Wis. S.B. 482 (1979).
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power to review the denial of access to a record. 5 9 Apparently sensing the insurmountable opposition which this bill
faced,1 60 its authors amended the bill by dropping the balancing tests and the attempt to specify the types of records to
which the balancing tests applied.' 6' The amendment also
deleted the concept of an Open Records Board, substituting
a provision under which the attorney general could give advisory opinions as to the applicability of the provisions of the
62
statute to specific materials or problems.
On March 26, 1982, a very heavily amended version of
the original bill was enacted. 63 The new public records statute, section 19.31-19.39, was given a delayed effective date of
January 1, 1983, in order to afford public officials and governmental bodies time to comply with the changes in the
public records law.' 64

IV.

THE PROVISIONS OF THE NEW PUBLIC RECORDS LAW

A.

Declarationof Policy

The amended Wisconsin public records law begins with
the following declaration of policy:
In recognition of the fact that a representative government is dependent upon an informed electorate, it is declared to be the public policy of this state that all persons
are entitled to the greatest possible information regarding
the affairs of government and the official acts of those officers and employes who represent them. Further, providing persons with such information is declared to be an
essential function of a representative government and an
integral part of the routine duties of officers and employes
whose responsibility it is to provide such information. To
159. Wis. S.B. 482 (1979).
160. The Wisconsin Associated Press passed a resolution which stated its support
of the bill if the following items were eliminated: the listing of exemptions, the reference to balancing tests, references to the privacy of records involving the private life
of individuals, the four-day waiting period for a record, and the formation of an open
records board to handle appeals. All of these items were omitted in the final
legislation.
161. Senate Substitute Amendment 1 to Wis. S.B. 250 (1981).
162. Id.
163. Fifty-five amendments were offered to Wis. S.B. 250 (1981) in the Senate
and Assembly. Eighteen of those amendments were adopted.
164. Wis. STAT. ANN. § 19.31 historical note (West 1972 & Supp. 1983-1984).
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that end, ss. 19.32 to 19.37 shall be construed in every instance with a presumption of complete public access, consistent with the conduct of governmental business. The
denial of public access generally is contrary to the public
interest, 65and only in an exceptional case may access be
denied. 1
Although similar language did not appear in the previous
public records statute, this declaration of policy does not
represent a dramatic departure from prior law because much
of the policy can be traced back to Wisconsin case law interpreting the predecessor statute. The first sentence of the declaration of policy echoes a statement by the Wisconsin
Supreme Court in Newspapers,Inc. v. Breier:166 "The public
records statute reflects a basic tenet of the democratic system-that the electorate must be informed of the workings
of government."1 67 The supreme court had also stated in
cases interpreting the previous public records statute the presumption that every public record is available for public inspection 68 and that only in an exceptional case will
inspection be denied. 69 The inclusion of this policy declaration in the amended statute may be interpreted as a strong
legislative approval of prior judicial pronouncements.
Unprecedented in either the prior statute or case law interpretation is the statement contained in the declaration of
policy that providing information to the public is "an integral part of the routine duties of officers and employees."' 70
This statement may broaden the responsibilities of various
public officials and employees because now, as part of their
official function or duties as public agents, they must provide
access to public records when a request is made. The statute
for the first time qualifies the presumption of complete access with a limitation that a request be "consistent with the
conduct of governmental business."' 7' This language may
perhaps be employed to guard against a request which is so
165.
166.
167.
168.
169.
(1965).
170.
171.

Wis. STAT. § 19.31 (1981-82).
89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).
Id. at 433-34, 279 N.W.2d at 187.
Id. at 433, 279 N.W.2d at 187.
State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 683, 137 N.W.2d 470, 475
WIs.STAT. § 19.31 (1981-82).
Id.
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broad or undefined that compliance would be extremely
time consuming and would unduly interfere with the other
duties of an office or individual.
B. Entities with Public Records
An initial determination which must precede the question of whether a record is accessible, is whether the record
is in the possession or control of an individual or entity subject to the public records law. Chapter 335 collectively identifies those under the jurisdiction of the public records law as
an "authority," and provides a comprehensive definition of
who is an authority. 172 The wording of the statute clearly
indicates that it applies to all three branches of government
and the subdivisions of each branch. 173 The statute also embraces two areas not covered in the previous public records
statute. Certain nonprofit corporations receiving governmental funding are brought within its scope. 174 Also, entities
acting under a contract with an "authority" must make
records produced or collected under that contract available
for public inspection. 75 Both these provisions bring records
of nongovernmental entities under the coverage of the public
records act and allow members of the public access to
records which may have been previously unavailable.
Chapter 335 identifies those individuals to whom a request for a record is to be made and who makes the determi172. Wis. STAT § 19.32(1) (1981-82). The statute provides:
"Authority" means any of the following having custody of a record: a state
or local office, elected official, agency, board, commission, committee, council,
department or public body corporate and politic created by constitution, law,
ordinance, rule or order, a governmental or quasi-governmental corporation;
any court of law; the assembly or senate; a nonprofit corporation which receives more than 50% of its funds from a county or a municipality, as defined
in § 59.001(3), and which provides services related to public health or safety to
the county or municipality; or a formally constituted subunit of any of the
foregoing.
Id.
173. Id.
174. Id. § 19.32(1) indicates that 50% governmental funding will bring nonprofit
corporations within the coverage of the public records statute. Several other states
have considered governmental funding as a criterion for inclusion under the public
records statute. See, e.g., Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 61.870(1) (Baldwin 1983) (25% of its
funding); W. VA. CODE § 29B-1-2(3) (1980) (any body primarily funded by state or
local authority).
175. Wis. STAT. § 19.36(3) (1981-82).
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nation whether inspection will be allowed to be "legal
custodians."'' 76 Elected officials and chairpersons of committees are custodians under the statute. 77 Additionally, both

elected officials and chairpersons may designate members of

their staff or committee to be legal custodians. 78 If an au-

thority fails to designate a legal custodian, the statute provides that the highest ranking officer and the chief
administrative officer, if any, are the legal custodians. '79 The
authority also has the responsibility to display information
regarding access to public records including the name of the
custodian.'80
C

Wfho May Inspect Public Records

Chapter 335 continues Wisconsin's longstanding pol176. Id. § 19.33 reads in part:
(1) An elected official is the legal custodian of his or her records and the
records of his or her office, but the official may designate an employe of his or
her staff to act as the legal custodian.
(2) The chairperson of a committee of elected officials, or the designee of
the chairperson, is the legal custodian of the records of the committee.
(3) The cochairpersons of ajoint committee of elected officials, or the designee of the cochairpersons, are the legal custodians of the records of the joint
committee.
(4) Every authority not specified in subs. (1) to (3) shall designate in writing one or more positions occupied by an officer or employe of the authority or
the unit of government of which it is a part as a legal custodian to fulfill its
duties under this subchapter. In the absence of a designation the authority's
highest ranking officer and the chief administrative officer, if any, are the legal
custodians for the authority. The legal custodian shall be vested by the authority with full legal power to render decisions and carry out the duties of the
authority under this subchapter. Each authority shall provide the name of the
legal custodian and a description of the nature of his or her duties under this
subchapter to all employes of the authority entrusted with records subject to
the legal custodian's supervision.
177. Id. § 19.33(l)-(2).
178. Id. § 19.33(1), (3).
179. Id. § 19.33(4).
180. Id. § 19.34(1) provides:
Each authority shall adopt, prominently display and make available for
inspection and copying at its offices, for the guidance of the public, a notice
containing a description of its organization and the established times and
places at which, the legal custodian under § 19.33 from whom, and the methods whereby, the public may obtain information and access to records in its
custody, make requests for records, or obtain copies of records, and the costs
thereof. This subsection does not apply to members of the legislature or to
members of any local governmental body.
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icy""1 that any person may inspect a public record.1 82 The
identity, motive or purpose of the individual seeking to inspect a public record is not a factor which can be considered
by the custodian. 183 As a result, only a determination relative to the content of a record may foreclose its disclosure.
In contrast, although FOIA states that "any person" may
make a request to inspect a public record, 84 one federal
court has upheld the denial of access to a requester who
sought to use information obtained for commercial purposes
on the ground that mail solicitation constituted an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. 85 The Wisconsin policy of not denying a request on the basis of the requester's
intended use is more compatible with the policy of the public records law in that there is a presumption of complete
18 6
access which may only be denied in an "exceptional case."'
The one qualification that chapter 335 adds to the right
of inspection is found in the words "[e]xcept as otherwise
provided by law."'187 This language indicates that in instances in which a particular statute specifically limits the
right of access to certain individuals or an agency, such a
statute takes precedence over the public records access provisions. 88 Examples of this situation include juvenile
records which are only open to members of the press' 8 9 and
welfare records which are only open to legislators. 90 Also
181. See supra text accompanying notes 74-77 and 83.
182. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(a) (1981-82) states: "Except as otherwise provided by
law, any requester has a right to inspect any record .... " An amendment to Wis.
S.B. 250 (1981), which would have required a requester to identify himself, was defeated by one vote.
183. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(1)(i) (1981-82). See also supra note 98. However, there
is one exception to this: "A requester may be required to show acceptable identification whenever the requested record is kept at a private residence or wherever security
reasons or federal law or regulations so require." Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(i)(1981-82).
184. 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(3) (1976).
185. HMG Marketing Ass'n v. Freeman, 523 F. Supp. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1980) (an
individual was disallowed inspection of a mailing list of persons who had purchased
historical silver dollars).
186. Wis. STAT. § 19.31 (1981-82).
187. Id. § 19.35(a).
188. Letter from Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. LaFollette to George
A. Schmus, City Attorney of West Allis, Wisconsin (Dec. 27, 1982).
189. See Wis. STAT. § 48.396(1) (1981-82).
190. See id. § 46.206(l)(bm).
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included are statutes which close records entirely.' 9'
D.

The Chapter 335 Definition of Public Record

A crucial section in any public records law is the provision that defines what materials are public records. Chapter
335 has greatly revised the earlier statutory definition of

public record both in terms of the form a record may take
and the nature or manner of acquisition of information92
which will be included or excluded as a public record.
The definition of the form which a record may take has been
expanded from the pre-amendment phrase "property and
things" 193 to a comprehensive definition which indicates that

a record can appear in virtually any form. 194 This revision is

consistent with the technological changes which have taken
place since the original statute first appeared in 1917.
From the standpoint of the manner of acquisition, chapter 335 indicates that, with four exceptions, material which
"has been created or is being kept by an authority"' 195 will be

a public record. Two of these exceptions appear for the first
time in the public records statute and are self-explanatory.
These exemptions include materials with limited access due
to patent, bequest or copyright, and published materials
191. For examples of these statutes see infra note 233.
192. Wis. STAT. § 19.32(2) (1981) defines a record as:
[Amny material on which written, drawn, printed, spoken, visual or electromagnetic information is recorded or preserved, regardless of physical form or characteristics, which has been created or is being kept by an authority. "Record"
includes, but is not limited to, handwritten, typed or printed pages, maps,
charts, photographs, films, recordings, tapes (including computer tapes), and
computer printouts. "Record" does not include drafts, notes, preliminary
computations and like materials prepared for the originator's personal use or
prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom the originator is
working; materials which are purely the personal property of the custodian
and have no relation to his or her office; materials to which access is limited by
copyright, patent or bequest; and published materials in the possession of an
authority other than a public library which are available for sale, or which are
available for inspection at a public library.
193. Wis. STAT. § 19.21 (1979) defined a record as "all property and things received. . . filed, deposited, or kept [by a public official]."
194. Wis. STAT. § 19.32(2) (1981-82).
195. Id. The Wisconsin Attorney General has stated that copies of documents
received from other agencies purely for informational purposes and concerning matters not affecting the department's function are not subject to disclosure under this
definition. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 28-83 (Aug. 4, 1983).
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available for sale or for inspection at a public library. 196
The third exclusion from the definition of public record
is "materials which are purely the personal property of the
custodian and have no relation to his or her office." 197 This
exclusion may be seen as a refinement of earlier case law
which recognized some materials to be "fugitive papers" and
indicated that if such items had no relation to the function of
the office, there was no requirement that they be kept as a
public record. 98 The attorney general, in a recent opinion
interpreting the chapter 335 definition of public record, advised that if records are prepared for an authority to serve an
"aim, function or need," they are public records. 199 If this
interpretation is followed by the courts, the addition of the
elements "aim!' and "need" may have the effect of narrowing the personal paper exception, effectively broadening the
definition of what is a public record.
The fourth area excluded did not appear previously in
the statute and presents many interpretational problems.
The amended statute excludes from the definition of public
record "drafts, notes, preliminary computations and like
materials prepared for the originator's personal use or prepared by the originator in the name of a person for whom
the originator is working." 2°° The scope and meaning of this
exclusion is problematic because a broad interpretation
could exclude a large number of documents from the realm
of accessible public records. 20 1 The exclusion of preliminary
documents follows the common-law view that only writings
which represent ultimate official actions should be public
196. Wis. STAT. § 19.32(2) (1981-82).
197. Id.
198. International Union v. Gooding, 251 Wis. 362, 370, 29 N.W.2d 730, 735
(1947); State ex rel. Dinneen v. Larson, 231 Wis. 207, 214, 284 N.W. 21, 25 (1939).
199. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 19-83 (June 2, 1983).
200. Wis. STAT. § 19.32(2) (1981-82). Further defining this language the Wiscon-

sin Attorney General has opined that "all preliminary versions of a document prepared by an employe for his or her own or another's signature do not constitute
'records' under section 19.32(2)." 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 28-83 (Aug. 4, 1983).
201. As an example of how dramatically this exclusion could have an impact on
access to records, consider the report to the mayor on police conduct in State ex rel.
Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 137 N.W.2d 470 (1965), and the investigator's
report to the state fire marshal in State ex rel. Spencer v. Freedy, 198 Wis. 388, 223
N.W. 861 (1929). Under the new statute both might fall into the preliminary document exception and thus not be public record.
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record and subject to inspection. 20 2 There exists the strong
public policy argument that insulating predecisional documents protects an agency's deliberative and consultative decision-making process by encouraging the candid exchange
of ideas and prevents premature disclosure which could disrupt agency procedures.20 3 However, if interpreted too
broadly, the exception of preliminary documents could consume the basic premise of open government that underlies
the public records statute.
The public records statute of Connecticut 2° 4 provides an
exemption similar to the Wisconsin statute and excludes
"preliminary drafts or notes.' 20 5 A recent Connecticut case,
Wilson v. Freedom of Information Commission,206 dealt with
the preliminary draft or note exclusion and involved the advisory report of a commission to the vice president of a public university.20 7 In its decision that the report was a
preliminary document, the Connecticut Supreme Court indicated that the exclusion contemplates two types of documents, one 208
that is "final" and another that is
"preliminary."
The court defined preliminary as "that aspect of the agency's function that precedes formal and informal decision making." 20 9 It described preliminary notes or
drafts as recommendations, advisory opinions and deliberations which are part of the government's decision-making
process.2 10 However, in the Connecticut public records statute, unlike Wisconsin's, preliminary drafts and notes are
listed as an exemption to the public records law and thus are
subject to a balancing test.21 In Wilson, the court, after deciding the report was a predecisional document, determined
202. See MacEwan v. Holm, 226 Or. 27, 359 P.2d 413 (1961).
203. See generally Conoco, Inc. v. United States, 521 F. Supp. 1301 (D. Del.
1981) (description of rationale behind the exemption for intraagency and interagency
memoranda in FOIA), maodfied, 687 F.2d 724 (3d Cir. 1982)
204. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 1-19(b) (West Supp. 1983-1984).
205. Id. at § 1-19(b)(1) provides: "[P]reliminary drafts or notes [are exempted
from access] provided the public agency has determined that the public interest in
withholding such documents clearly outweighs the public interest in disclosure."
206. 181 Conn. 324, 435 A.2d 353 (1980).
207. Id. at , 435 A.2d at 356.
208. Id. at , 435 A.2d at 358.
209. Id. at _ 435 A.2d at 359.
210. Id.
211. Id. at
435 A.2d at 361.

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW[.

[Vol. 67:65

that the public interest in withholding the document outweighed the public interest in its disclosure because of a
promise of confidentiality which had been given, the potential embarrassment to individuals criticized in the report,
and the "panic" that could be caused by the structural revisions proposed. 2 The Wisconsin exclusion of preliminary
materials, however, is an exclusion within the definition of
public record rather than an exemption and as such is not
subject to a balancing test such as the one employed in Connecticut. Thus, once the decision is made that a document is
preliminary, the deliberation seemingly ends - it is not accessible to the public. The finality of the Wisconsin preliminary document exclusion should give government officials
and custodians more certainty that their work will be kept
private, but it has the undesirable effect of concealing from
public scrutiny the decision-making process itself.
Other decisions which may be instructive in defining preliminary materials are those dealing with the fifth exemption
to FOIA which pertains to intraagency and interagency
communication. 3 The Wilson court used judicial interpretations of the intraagency and interagency FOIA exemption
as instructive in defining preliminary documents, 21 4 and
Wisconsin may choose to do the same since there is a great
deal of case law on the intraagency and interagency communication exemption.2 1 5 Federal courts have distinguished between decisional and predecisional memoranda stating that
"predecisional" memoranda are composed exclusively for
the purpose of assisting in policy formation while "decisional" memoranda are documents which reflect policy already made and announced by the agency.216 One
unanswered question with this definition is whether predecisional material becomes public record once a decision is
reached and announced. In order to fulfill the policy behind
public records laws, it would appear that the preliminary
212. Id. at _, 435 A.2d at 362.

213. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) (1976).
214. 181 Conn. at _, 435 A.2d at 359.
215. See, e.g., LITIGATION UNDER FOIA, supra note 24, at 67-76 (detailing the

large number of cases on this FOIA exemption).
216. See, e.g., Grumman Aircraft v. Renegotiation Bd., 482 F.2d 710, 718-19
(D.C. Cir. 1973), rev'd, 421 U.S. 168 (1975).
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data should be disclosed so that the public can evaluate the
basis and the information upon which public officials have
relied in reaching a decision.
In addition to the four exceptions stated in the statute to
the definition of public record, two recent informal opinion
letters of the attorney general indicate an additional area
which is not to be considered a public record. The interpretations or mental impressions of state employees concerning
the content of public records 217 and information known by a
custodian but not reduced to record 218 are not, in the attorney general's opinion, accessible through the public records
law. Although a contrary determination, requiring a custodian to divulge everything known regarding a public record,
would be impractical and undesirable, it should be recognized that these exceptions may encourage authorities to
avoid reducing information to a recordable format in order
to bypass the complications of dealing with the public
records statute.
One additional concern with the definition of public record in the Wisconsin public records statute is that there exists in the statutes another definition of public record which
is different from the chapter 335 definition. 21 9 However, if
each definition is used in the exact context of the statute in
which it appears, confusion should be minimized. Although
there is a certain amount of overlap, one definition of public
record pertains primarily to the permanent preservation of
important state records 220 while the chapter 335 definition
appears to have been intended for broader utilization.
217. Letter from Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. LaFollette to Meredith
E. Ostrom, Director, Geological and Natural History Survey (June 2, 1983) (responding to questions of the Geological and Natural History Society regarding how to answer inquiries made by the Federal Department of Energy regarding the long-term
disposal of high-level radioactive waste in Wisconsin).
218. Letter from Wisconsin Attorney General Bronson C. LaFollette to Kevin C.
Potter, District Attorney of Wood County (June 17, 1983) (responding to questions
regarding disclosure of information of alleged shoplifting by a police chief).
219. Wis. STAT. § 16.61(2)(b) (1981-82) provides:
"Public records" means all books, papers, maps, photographs, films, recordings, or other documentary materials or any copy thereof, regardless of
physical form or characteristics, made, or received by any agency of state or its
officers or employes in connection with the transaction of public business, except the records and correspondence of any member of the state legislature.
220. Id. § 16.61(l).
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E. Limitations on the Right of Inspection
Although chapter 335 presumes that a public record will
be available for inspection, the legislation also recognizes a
number of areas in which public records may be exempt
from disclosure. These exemptions represent areas in which
the legislature has determined that reasons for withholding
information outweigh the advantages of disclosing it. Some
of the exemptions preclude the use of a balancing of interest
test, the only issue being whether the information sought is
covered by the exemption. Other exemptions, however, are
still subject to the application of the Wisconsin common-law
balancing test by the custodian and by the court upon
review.
A difficulty which may arise in a determination as to
whether particular material falls within an exemption is that
there is no statutory or case law guidance as to whether exemptions should be broadly or narrowly construed. On the
basis of the overriding Wisconsin presumption that a record
is open to the public and the fact that most states and the
federal act have indicated their exemptions are to be narrowly construed,221 Wisconsin is likely to also construe these
exemptions narrowly. Each area of exempted material will
be described in the subsections to follow.
1. Records Exempted by State or Federal Law.
Records which are specifically exempted from disclosure
by state or federal law are not open to inspection. 2 This is
an absolute exemption, but the language of the exemption
does indicate that if only a portion of the record consists of
exempted information, the nonexempt portions are open to
the public.223 This provision rests upon a sound policy basis
but may prove difficult to implement as custodians under221. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 739.
222. Wis. STAT. § 19.36(1) (1981-82) provides:
Any record which is specifically exempted from disclosure by state or federal
law or authorized to be exempted from disclosure by state law is exempt from
disclosure under s. 19.35(1), except that any portion of that record which contains public information is open to public inspection as provided in sub. (6).
223. Id.
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take the task of sorting out and deleting exempt portions of
records.
Two Wisconsin cases have dealt with situations in which
a custodian masked confidential portions of a record so that
nonconfidential portions could be made available. In State
ex rel Dalton v. Mundy22 4 an individual doing statistical research sought Milwaukee County Hospital's records concerning abortion cases.225 Stating that a breach of
confidence between the facility, its doctors and patients
would result from disclosure of the records, the hospital denied the request. 2 6 However, the court ruled that public
policy favored the inspection of these public records and
granted the suggestion of the requester that she be given copies with the patients' names obscured.227
A similar approach, however, backfired against a municipality in Maynardv. City of Madison.228 Maynard had been
a paid police informer, who, with the assurance that her
identity would be kept confidential, reported on local radical
groups protesting during the Vietnam War.229 In response to
a request, the department made public edited versions of intelligence reports. 230 Although her name was deleted, the activities and people Maynard had described in her reports
made her identity obvious.23 ' She was exposed as an informer in a local newspaper, suffered harassment 232 and
brought a successful suit against the municipality. The Maynard case vividly reveals the serious problem a custodian
may face when determining which portions of a body of material are confidential and which portions are not.
Another problem which custodians may face is that there
are a large number of both state23 3 and federaF 34 statutes
224. 80 Wis. 2d 190, 257 N.W.2d 877 (1977).

225.
226.
227.
228.
229.

Id. at 192, 257 N.W.2d at 879.
Id.
Id. at 195-96, 257 N.W.2d at 879-80.
101 Wis. 2d 273, 304 N.W.2d 163 (Ct. App. 1981).
Id. at 275, 304 N.W.2d at 165.

230. Id.

231. Id. at 277, 304 N.W.2d at 166.
232. Id.

233. A partial listing of Wisconsin statutes which indicate that the records or certain information on the records may be either absolutely closed to inspection or
closed under certain conditions include records involving: juveniles, Wis. STAT.
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which dictate that certain records are to be closed to public
inspection in some or all situations.235 There is presently no
compilation of all the exemptions. Those custodians who
are knowledgeable about laws pertaining to specific categories of records under their supervision may not have a problem determining what material is exempted by other
statutes. However, custodians who do not regularly receive
public requests for records may be faced with very difficult
questions.
2.

Use of the Balancing Test.

Chapter 335 provides that "[s]ubstantive common law
principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive
copies of records shall remain in effect." 236 This provision
indicates that the judicial balancing test continues to be operative in determining whether to grant inspection of a public record.237 The statute also provides that the custodian
must specifically state the reasons for denial if, after weighing the competing public policy interests, the custodian de§ 48.396

(1981-82); child care agencies, id. § 48.78; adoption, id. § 48.93; abused or
neglected children, id. § 48.981(10); welfare recipients, id. § 49.001; medical assistance
recipients, id. § 49A5(4); vocational rehabilitation records, id.§ 47.40(13); AFDC recipients, id. § 49.53(l)(b); health care facilities, id. § 50.03(2)(e); mental health reports, id. § 51.30(4)(b); protective placement, id. § 55.06(17); illegitimate births, id.
§ 69.30(1); congenital disabilities, id. § 69.32; income tax returns, id. § 71.11(44); real
estate transfer fees, id. § 77.23(2); employment records, id. § 103.13; pupil records, id.
§ 118.125(2); communicable disease reports, id. § 143.07(7); patient health care
records, id. § 146.82; pollution monitoring reports, id. § 147.08(2); employment relations records, id. § 230.13; juvenile license suspensions, id. § 343.30(5); accident reports, id. § 349.19; coroner's blood tests, id. § 346.71(2); incompetency findings, id.
§ 880.33(6); privileged communications, id. § 905.03-.05; identity of an informer, id.
§ 905.10; investigatory law enforcement files, id. § 905.09.
234. Examples of records which federal laws require to be closed to inspection
include: 20 U.S.C. § 1232(g) (1976) (The Family Educational Rights and Privacy
Act); 21 U.S.C. § 1175 (1976) (patient records).
235. The interplay of other statutory provisions was demonstrated in a recent
case, State ex rel. Bilder v. Township of Delavan, 112 Wis. 2d 539, 334 N.W.2d 252
(1983), in which the supreme court determined that exhibits attached to pleadings
were not governed by the public records law but by Wis. STAT. § 59.14(1) (1981-82).
The court further stated that the exceptions to the right of public access under
§ 59.14(1) were different from those in the public records law.
236. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(a) (1981-82).
237. This has been confirmed by the attorney general. Letter from Bronson C.
LaFollette, Attorney General of Wisconsin to James W. Conway, City Attorney of
Kenosha (March 1, 1983).
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cides the reasons for nondisclosure outweigh the
presumption in favor of disclosure.238
While the use of a balancing test is a recognized method
of resolving the conflict between the need to inform the public and the need for personal and governmental confidentiality, there are some problems inherent in the use of the test in
Wisconsin. The side of the equation which recognizes the
presumption of the public right to know cannot always take
into account the gravity of the need to know because the requester is not required to be identified or to state a motive or
purpose for requesting a record. On the other side of the
balance, that which weighs the countervailing public interest
in nondisclosure, the statute provides little guidance as to the
interests to be considered. The original version of chapter
335 contained the balancing test and listed the specific types
of records to which the balancing test was to be applied.239
However, the wording of the balancing test and the specific
listing of exemptions were omitted in the final bill enacted
into law. Because there is no specific mention of the balancing test in the statute and its use is described only in case
law, it is questionable whether it will be fully or properly
utilized by many records custodians. Also, a records custodian will have difficulty applying a legal test, the results of
which attorneys and judges may differ on.
3.

Exemptions Inferable from the Open Meeting Law.

Chapter 335 restates the previous judicial acknowledgment that there is an interplay between the exemptions to
the requirement of open sessions for governmental bodies
and the right to inspect a public record. 240 The Wisconsin
open meeting law24 1 provides that meetings of governmental
bodies are to be open to the public unless the agenda falls
within one of eight stated exemptions.242 The amended pub238. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(a) (1981-82).
239. See supra note 158.
240. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(a) (1981-82).
241. Id. §§ 19.81-.98.
242. Id. § 19.85. The eight exemptions are: deliberation concerning a trial or
hearing; considering dismissal, demotion, licensing, discipline, tenure or charges
against a public employee or licensee; considering employment, promotion compensation or evaluation of a public employee; considering applications for probation or
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lic records statute provides that these open meeting
exemptions:
are indicative of public policy, but may be used as grounds
for denying public access to a record only if the authority
or legal custodian. . . makes a specific demonstration that
there is a need to restrict public access at the time that the
request to inspect or copy the record is made.2 43
This language indicates that the use of the open meeting
exemptions are not absolute in the context of public records
and consequently must be used in conjunction with the balancing test. In the requirement that the custodian specifically demonstrate the need to restrict access at the time of
the request, the legislature appears to indicate that although,
at an earlier point, material may have been too sensitive or
damaging to disclose, this may not be used as a justification
to continue its nondisclosure merely because it fits under one
of the exceptions to the open meeting law.244 This may represent a significant curtailment of the previous judicial recognition of the applicability of the open meeting law to
information in records since it requires a "specific demonstration" that there be a concurrent need "at the time that
the request. . . is made. 245 This is a much higher standard
than previously set forth by the Wisconsin Supreme
Court.

2 4 6

The Wisconsin Supreme Court, thus far, has focused its
attention solely on one of the exemptions found in the public
meeting law: those situations in which financial, medical,
social or personal histories and disciplinary data which
could unduly damage reputations was under considera-

parole or strategies for crime detection or prevention; deliberating or negotiating
competitive bargaining of public funds; considering financial, medical, social or personal histories of employees; conferring with legal counsel; or considering advice
from an ethics board. Id.
243. Id. § 19.35(l)(a).
244. See supra note 242.
245. Wis. STAT. § 19.35(l)(a) (1981-82).
246. See Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 430, 279 N.W.2d 179, 185
(1979), in which the court stated merely that "the legislative policy expressed in [the
opening meeting statute] 'carries over to the field of inspection of public records and
documents.'" (quoting State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 685, 137
N.W.2d 470, 476 (1965)).
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tion.2 47 This exemption appears to have the greatest possibility for application to the public records law.
The largest number of exceptions under the open meeting law pertain to employment situations. 248 However, the
employee records statute249 may operate to open up employment records deemed nondisclosable under an application of
the policies embodied in the exceptions to the open meeting
law in instances in which an "employee 2 50 or his "representative" 251 makes a request for personnel records. In much
the same way that the Wisconsin Supreme Court applied the
policy considerations of the open meeting law in recognizing
exceptions to the prior public records statute,252 the employee records statute contains a set of exceptions2 53 and underlying policies to the right of access which may be added
to the categories of reasons for legitimate denial of access to
public records.
4.

Other Specific Exemptions in Chapter 335.

Although a detailed listing of exemptions was eliminated
from the original draft of the law, seven specific exemptions
to the public records law remain. Their inclusion appears to
be due either to their noncontroversial nature or to the personal interest legislators had in them. The wording of these
exemptions indicates they are absolute rather than subject to
the balancing of interests.
Computer programs are specifically exempted from inspection under the public records statute, but the data inputted and material produced is subject to inspection.2 5 4
Information which qualifies as a common-law trade secret is
247. WIs. STAT. § 19.85(1)(b) (1981-82) (concerning dismissal, demotion, licensing and discipline).
248. Id. § 19.85(l)(c) (concerning promotion, employment, compensation or performance evaluation).
249. Id. § 103.13(2).

250. Id. § 103.13(l)(b).
251. Id. § 103.13(3).
252. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 429-30, 279 N.W.2d 179, 185
(1979); State ex rel. Youmans v. Owens, 28 Wis. 2d 672, 685, 137 N.W.2d 470, 476
(1965).
253. The exceptions are found in two provisions: Wis. STAT. § 103.13(5)-(6)
(1981-82).
254. Wis. STAT. § 19.36(4). See also 68 Op. Att'y Gen. 231 (1979).
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also immune from disclosure. 2 " Chapter 335 closes public
library circulation records from the purview of public in-

spection. 6 The legislation also closes two categories of
materials which obviously elicited a personal concern on the
part of the legislators: research and drafting requests made
to the legislative council staff2 57 and current audits performed by the legislative audit bureau 258 are exempted from
disclosure.
Investigative law enforcement records are exempted
from inspection whenever federal law requires they be kept
confidential or their confidentiality is a condition to the receipt of federal aid.259 This provision is the only one in the

public records statute which addresses law enforcement
records. Newspapers,Inc. v. Breier,260 a case which involved
the Milwaukee police chief's refusal to provide the Milwaukee Journalnewspaper with access to records, provides some
guidance regarding the treatment of law enforcement
records not specifically addressed by state or federal law.
The Breier court stated that the records custodian must
weigh the competing interests involved in disclosure in determining whether to permit access to police records. 261 Af-

ter weighing the interests involved, the court determined that
daily arrest records, often called the police "blotter," which
records the cause of arrest when individuals are taken into
custody, were available for inspection. 262

The court in

Breier, however, declined to decide whether "rap sheets,"
255. Wis. STAT. § 19.36(5) (1981-82). The Wisconsin Supreme Court has
adopted the Restatement of Torts definition of trade secret which provides: "A trade
secret may consist of any formula, pattern, device or compilation of information
which is used in one's business, and which gives him an opportunity to obtain an
advantage over competitors who do not know or use it." RESTATEMENT OF TORTS
§ 757 comment b (1939). See Gary Van Zeeland Talent, Inc. v. Sandas, 84 Wis. 2d
202, 267 N.W.2d 242 (1978).
256. Wis. STAT. § 43.30 (1981-82).
257. Id. § 13.91.
258. Id. § 13.94.
259. Id. § 19.36(2). However, if state law specifically requires the disclosure of
the record despite the fact that nondisclosure is a condition to receipt of federal aids
by the state, the record is not exempt from disclosure. Letter from Bronson C. LaFollette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to George Schmus (Dec. 27, 1982).
260. 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).
261. Id. at 427, 279 N.W.2d at 184.
262. Id. at 423, 279 N.W.2d at 182.
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the record kept on an individual with an arrest record, must
be disclosed.263 The attorney general, in a formal opinion,
has given additional guidance regarding law enforcement
records.264 Where an official obtains information under a
clear pledge of confidentiality and there is no specific statutory authority regarding its submission, the information is
not accessible. 265 In a private letter ruling the attorney general has also stated that to preserve the integrity of an ongoing investigation, records relating to a specific case may be
for nonwithheld from disclosure.266 However, that reason 267
disclosure will disappear once a case is concluded.
F. Access to Public Records
Chapter 335 contains extremely specific details defining
the duties of authorities and custodians in facilitating a request for inspection of a public record. The degree of detail
appears to have been directed at facilitating the accessing of
public records while still providing some protection against
disruption of governmental offices. However, in practice
and despite such intentions, some of the provisions may create new problems. The paragraphs which follow describe
the new provisions.
An authority must display a notice describing the times,
location and identity of individuals from whom access to
records and copies of records may be obtained.268 The cost
of copies must also be prominently displayed. 269 Authorities
must permit access to records during regular office hours.
An authority must provide facilities comparable to those
used by its employees to those wishing to inspect or copy a
record.271
263.
264.
265.
266.
Vandel,
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.

Id. at 424, 279 N.W.2d at 183.
60 Op. Att'y Gen. 284, 289 (1971).
Id.
Letter from Bronson C. LaFollette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to Joe
News Director WYUR-FM (May 20, 1983).
Id.
Wis. STAT. § 19.34(4) (1981-82).
Id.
Id. § 19.34(2).
Id. § 19.35(2).

MARQUETTE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67:65

In regard to fees charged to the requester of a record, the
statute states that the fee for copying a record cannot exceed
the "actual, necessary and direct cost. ' 272 There may be an
additional fee charged for locating records, but only if the
cost of location exceeds fifty dollars. 73 These fee provisions
have raised many questions, some of which have been recently addressed in opinions of the attorney general. The
attorney general has opined that the "actual, necessary and
direct cost of copying" may include the cost of paper and the
rental of a copier, but may not include overhead or set-up
charges.274 The attorney general has also indicated that the
275
labor involved in making copies may be considered a cost,
but the cost of separating confidential from nonconfidential
information must be borne by the agency.2 76 If another statute establishes a higher fee for copies of a particular record,
this fee may be charged,277 but a custodian may not require a
requester to pay the cost of unrequested certification.278
Chapter 335 provides that an authority must fill a request
or notify the requester of reasons for denial "as soon as practicable and without delay." 279 There may, however, be delays as the need arises to resort to legal counsel for advice
despite the fact that many procedures are stated in the statute. A denial in response to a written request must be in
writing. 280 A mandamus action may be commenced only after a written request has been made and denied.28 1 A request must reasonably describe the records being sought.28 2
272. Id. § 19.35(3)(a)-(b).
273. Id. § 19.35(3)(c). The attorney general has indicated that the cost of a computer run may not be considered a location fee. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 19-83 (June 2,
1983).
274. Letter from Bronson C. LaFollette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to Attorney Robert A. Christensen (Mar. 8, 1983).
275. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 40-83 (Sept. 16, 1983).
276. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 28-83 (Aug. 4, 1983).
277. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 9-83 (Mar. 1, 1983); letter from Bronson C. LaFollette,
Wisconsin Attorney General, to Arnold E. Hedtke (May 11, 1983).
278. 72 Op. Att'y Gen. 9-83 (Mar. 1, 1983).
279. WIs. STAT. § 19.35(4)(a) (1981-82).
280. Id. § 19.35(4)(b). An oral request may be denied orally, unless the requester
demands a written statement of reasons for the denial within five business days of the
oral denial. Id.
281. Id. § 19.37(l).
282. Id. § 19.35(l)(h).
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Requested materials are not reasonably described if the request does not limit the subject matter or length of time represented by the record. 83
A requester also has the right to receive a copy of a record including audio and videotapes.2 84 A photocopy, video
copy or audio recording must be substantially as good as the
original.2 85 No copies must be supplied
if the record will
2 86
soon be offered for sale or distribution.
Authorities do not have to create a new record for a requester.287 Authorities do have to sort out and release nonconfidential materials when they are mixed with confidential
materials. 88 Authorities can impose reasonable restrictions
on the manner of access if the record is easily damaged or
irreplacable 289 and may reproduce the requested copies
themselves
rather than allowing the requester to copy
290
them.
G. Enforcement of the Act and Remedies
Chapter 335 adds enforcement alternatives and penalties
to the public records statute which may have the effect of
encouraging litigation over a denial of access to a record. A
requester who has been denied access may seek enforcement
of the right of access by bringing an action for a writ of mandamus personally29 ' or may request that either the district
attorney or the attorney general bring the action.29 2 The alternative of requesting either the attorney general or the dis283. Id.
284. Id. § 19.35(l)(d).
285. Id. § 19.35(l)(b), (d). An audio recording must be substantially as audible
as the original or the authority may provide a transcript of the original. Id.
§ 19.35(l)(c).
286. Id. § 19.35(l)(g).
287. Id. § 19.35(l)(1).
288. Id. § 19.36(6).
289. Id. § 19.35(l)(k).
290. Id. § 19.35(1)(b). The copy must be substantially as readable as the original.
-d.
291. Wis. STAT. § 19.37(l)(a) (1981-82).
292. Id. § 19.37(1)(b). The request must be in writing and may be directed either
to the district attorney "where the record is found" or to the attorney general. However, the involvement of the attorney general and district attorney is permissible
under Wis. STAT. § 19.37(l)(b) (1981-82). At present, the attorney general follows a
deferral policy with respect to alleged violations of the open meeting law:
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trict attorney to bring an action should serve to encourage
those who might not have the personal resources to bring a

lawsuit to challenge the denial of a record request. However, it should be noted that the wording of the statute indi-

cates that bringing such an action by the attorney general, or
district attorney is discretionary rather than mandatory. Another enforcement aid in the amended statute allows a requester who "prevails in whole or in substantial part in any
action filed" the award of "reasonable attorney fees, damages of not less than $100 and other actual costs to the requester. ' 293 These provisions may encourage requesters and

their attorneys to pursue a legal action even if the district
attorney or attorney general declines to become involved.294
Although the litigation expense barrier can be overcome
by a requester, the new statute does not suggest which fac-

tors a court may take into consideration in determining the
award of attorney fees. Wisconsin courts may find assistance in existing federal case law.295 In addition to the potenIt has been the long-standing practice of this office to defer to the prosecutorial
capacity and function of local prosecutors in connection with alleged violations of Wisconsin's open meetings law. Because this practice results in greater
efficiency and success, since the local prosecutors are better equipped to delve
into pertinent facts and obtain necessary witnesses, we believe it is advisable to
continue this policy in connection with the public records law.
Letter from Bronson C. LaFollette, Wisconsin Attorney General, to Elliott Maraniss,
Editor, The CapitalTimes (Feb. 22, 1983) (discussing request that the attorney general
bring legal action against officers of the University of Wisconsin System for their
unwillingness to allow newspapers access to records which reflected nonuniversity
outside activities by faculty members).
293. Wis. STAT. § 19.37(2) (1981-82). In FOIA, a comparable provision exists for
the awarding of attorney fees and costs under a "substantially prevailed" standard:
"The court may assess against the United States reasonable attorney fees and other
litigation costs reasonably incurred in any case under this section in which the complainant has substantially prevailed." 5 U.S.C. § 552(a)(4)(E) (1976).
294. With respect to the litigation expense barrier associated with federal records,
the court in Cuneo v. Rumsfeld, 553 F.2d 1360, 1363-64 (D.C. Cir. 1977) observed:
"Congress realized that too often the insurmountable barrier presented by court costs
and attorney fees to the average person requesting information under FOIA enabled
the government to escape compliance with the law."
295. Whether a requester has substantially prevailed must be considered. See
generally Vermont Low Income Advocacy Council, Inc. v. Usery, 546 F.2d 509, 513
(2d Cir. 1976) (court agreed with the virtually unanimous consensus that attorney fees
could be awarded even if the documents were voluntarily disclosed by the government prior to judgment); Exner v. FBI, 443 F. Afupp. 1349, 1353 (S.D. Cal. 1978) (a
plaintiff substantially prevails by compelling an agency to release documents on a
"priority basis"), aft'd, 612 F.2d 1202 (9th Cir. 1980).
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tial award of attorney fees, damages and costs, the new
statute sanctions the awarding of punitive damages to the
requester where "an authority or legal custodian. . . has arbitrarily and capriciously denied or delayed response to a
request or charged excessive fees. ' 296 However, it is not
clear whether the payment of punitive damages is the responsibility of the unit of government employing the legal

custodian or public official or is to be paid personally by the
custodian or public official. 297 The majority of courts which

have considered the question of liability for punitive damages have held that a governmental entity is not liable for

punitive damages, occasioned by the wrongful acts of its employees or officials unless authorized or ratified in some

manner.298 It would not be difficult for Wisconsin to adopt

the majority approach since it appears to be based upon
sound public policy considerations. The purpose of punitive
damages is to punish and deter reckless, willful or wanton

conduct.299 Such conduct is beyond the scope of employ-

ment .3 ° The imposition of this penalty on a governmental
entity rather than on an official or employee negates the deterrence aspect of punitive damages on the wrongdoer. It

296. Wis. STAT. § 19.37(3) (1981-82). Accord J. GHIARDI &J. KIRCHER, Punitive
Damages Law & Practice § 5.01 (Supp. 1983) (The award of punitive damages in
Wisconsin is justified upon "a showing of wanton, willful or reckless disregard of the
plaintiff's rights."); see also Jeffers v. Nysse, 98 Wis. 2d 543, 548, 297 N.W.2d 495, 497
(1980).
297. Wis. STAT. § 19.37(3) (1981-82). This section does not contain language
found in Wis. STAT. § 19.37(2) (1981-82) which has the effect of holding legal custodians and public officials harmless.
298. See, e.g., Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 U.S. 247 (1981) (municipalities
are immune from punitive damages in 1983 actions); Shore v. County of Mohave, 644
F.2d 1320 (9th Cir. 1981) (city held not liable for punitive damages stemming from
false imprisonment claim against police officer); Fisher v. City of Miami, 172 So. 2d
455 (Fla. 1965) (assault by police officer was intentional act and to impose punitive
damages on municipality would not punish officer); George v. Chicago Transit Authority, 58 IM. App. 3d 692, 374 N.E.2d 679 (1978) (compensatory but not punitive
damages recoverable from transit authority after train collision). But see Bonsignore
v. City of New York, 521 F. Supp. 394 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (city liable for punitive damages where police officer shot his wife before committing suicide); Young v. City of
Des Moines, 262 N.W.2d 612 (Iowa 1973) (city held liable for punitive damages resulting from an act of one of its police officers).
299. See supra note 296.
300. See, e.g., Harris v. County of Racine, 512 F. Supp. 1273 (E.D. Wis. 1981).
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can also place an unjust burden on taxpapers who lack total
control over employee conduct.3 ° '
Perhaps in an effort to maximize the options available to
the district attorney and the attorney general, the new statute
allows the pursuit of a forfeiture action resulting in a possible forfeiture not exceeding $1,000.302 It is not clear whether
such an action is allowable in addition to an action for punitive damages, or in lieu of such an action. In both instances,
the standard is the same: "arbitrarily and capriciously denied or delayed response to a request or charged excessive
fees. ' 30 3 It is conceivable that the forfeiture action may
serve no real purpose if the attorney general is put in a position of prosecuting a state agency for policies or practices
which are viewed as undesirable. Moreover, an inherent
conflict of interest may exist if the attorney general or the
district attorney pursues such actions since they represent the
state of Wisconsin in civil and criminal matters.
V. A MISSING ELEMENT: PRIVACY PROTECTION
In striking a balance between the right of the public to
know and the competing rights of individuals, the Wisconsin
public records law overlooks the right of confidentiality, a
right the United States Supreme Court has described as "the
individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters. ' 3 4 In order to carry on their delegated functions such
as education, police protection, dispensing welfare benefits,
licensing and taxation, governmental agencies must acquire
detailed information on citizens.3 °5 Much of this information is supplied with the express or implied understanding
that it will be kept confidential.
A majority of the states and FOIA 3°0 have some type of
privacy exemptions covering confidential information in
301. Nevertheless, the Wisconsin Attorney General has concluded that punitive
damages and forfeitures can be the liability of both the agency and the employee, but
that the employee will be indemnified for punitive damages but not for forfeitures. 72
Op. Att'y Gen. 28-83 (Aug. 4, 1983).
302. Wis. STAT. § 19.37(4) (1981-82).
303. Id. § 19.37(3)-(4).
304. Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 599 (1977).
305. See Project, supra note 2, at 1244-45.
306. 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(6) (1976).
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their public records statute or in separate legislation.3 0 7 Wisconsin, however, has not adequately dealt with privacy
problems inherent in information collection and its release,
except through separate statutes which deal only with a specific type of record.30 8 The Wisconsin public records statute
contains no specific exemption dealing with privacy and the
balancing test makes no mention of the privacy concern.
The balancing test, as enunciated by the supreme court,
weighs the need of the public to be informed against the
harm to the public interest rather than harm to any private
interest in the release of the record. 30 9 Although Newspapers,
Inc. v. Breier3 10 did consider the harm to reputation through
the disclosure of arrest information,3 ' reputation is only one
aspect of the right of privacy and the court has not faced
other legitimate privacy interests such as the right to confidentiality inherent in the disclosure of personal information.
Wisconsin's privacy statute, enacted in 1977, does not
protect the privacy rights of individuals when confidential
information is contained in public records. 312 The statute
provides, "[it is not an invasion of privacy to communicate
any information available to the public as a matter of public
record. 31 3 The supreme court, referring to the foregoing
legislation, has stated, "individuals have no right of privacy
in materials contained in public records that are open to the
public generally."3 14 Thus in both the privacy statute and
Athe public records statute neither the Wisconsin Legislature
nor the Wisconsin Supreme Court has confronted the privacy right of an individual regarding confidential information given to a governmental agency.
307. Braverman & Heppler, supra note 26, at 745.
308. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. § 118.125(2) (1981-82) (pupil records); id. § 146.82 (patient health care records).
309. Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 427, 279 N.W.2d 179, 184 (1979).
310. 89 Wis. 2d 417, 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979).
311. Id. at 433, 279 N.W.2d at 187.
312. See Wis. STAT. § 895.50 (1981-82).
313. Id. § 895.50(2)(c).
314. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d at 431-32, 279 N.W.2d at 186.
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CONCLUSION

Although the recent revision of the Wisconsin public
records statute was launched several years ago as an attempt
to comprehensively codify the substantive law and detail the
procedural mechanics associated with access to public
records, the final product, although extensive, failed to fully
achieve earlier goals. Instead of a legislative condensation
of substantive standards found in prior case law in one statute for more convenient reference and application or an
elaboration of a judicially devised "balancing test," chapter
335 merely permits the continuation of some lingering
problems and uncertainties of the existing substantive law by
providing that "[s]ubstantive common law principles construing the right to inspect, copy or receive copies of records
shall remain in effect. ' 315 Thus, the new statute can be
viewed as a silent acknowledgement that either the substantive law status quo was deemed adequate or perhaps that the
challenge of localizing and reconciling in one statutory section the multitude of other statutory records provisions and
interpretive judicial pronouncements is better left for another time.
The new legislation fails to consider the role of privacy
with respect to public records in any direct fashion. It does
not enhance in a practical manner the ability of legal custodians to apply the broadly stated balancing test. It fails to
give any insight to the judiciary on how the privacy rights of
individuals must be weighed in the context of applying the
balancing test - a general formula which on its face considers only whether the harm to thepublic outweighs the presumption of benefit to thepublic. By not listing in one place
the recognized statutory exemptions, it complicates the task
of custodians who must hunt out and interpret provisions on
public records scattered in various unrelated provisions of
the Wisconsin statutes. This shortcoming may foster uncertainty on the part of custodians which may necessitate further consultation with legal counsel. This additional step
may infuse delay into the process of obtaining access to public records. This is especially true since the legislation is am315.

Wis.

STAT. § 19.35(1)(a) (1981-82).
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biguously drafted in regard to who is financially responsible
for the payment of punitive damages or a forfeiture in the
event of a violation. To the extent that the new statute acknowledges the interplay of policy considerations associated
with the open meeting law, it does not clearly specify the
weight which those policies are to carry, especially when the
burden is affirmatively placed on the legal custodian to make
a "specific demonstration that there is a need to restrict public access." 316 The kind of showing which a custodian must
make and the manner in which it must be accomplished is
left uncertain.
On the other hand, chapter 335 unambiguously declares
that an essential function of government includes providing
information. This statement is further enhanced by the
statement of the "presumption of complete public access,
'317
consistent with the conduct of governmental business.
The new statute also details procedural ground rules which
do enhance the mechanical process of accessing public
records while at the same time permitting individual tailoring within each "authority" as to: the level of status and
number of personnel who will be responsible for serving in
the role of records custodian, the fees that will be charged
for searching and copying records, the hours of access and
the setting within which the examination of public records
may occur. To assure compliance, a rather broad range of
compliance devices are provided: a writ of mandamus, damages, attorney fees, costs, punitive damages and forfeiture
penalties as well as the discretionary assistance of the offices
of the district attorney or attorney general.
While there remain numerous areas which await further
judicial clarification and despite the disappointing silence of
this legislation relative to the substantive law, on balance,
chapter 335 can be viewed as a positive step in the evolution
of public records law in Wisconsin.
LINDA DE LA MORA

316. Id.
317. Id § 19.31.

